ABSTRACT:-Roman law and the legal principle under that law is silent about an action for loss of support by the dependants of a breadwinner whose death was unlawfully caused by the defendant or wrongdoer. It was only under the Germanic custom that the life of a person had value capable of being estimated in monetary terms. The actions of the widow and children for loss of support are derived from the fact that they evoke support from the deceased during his lifetime. This paper also forged a solution to legal questions such as whether dependants can claim damages for loss of income in cases where the breadwinner or husband is negligent, and whether a husband can claim for loss of support due to the death of his wife? This study answers the question by relying on case law Union Government v Lee in which the judge decided that the negligence of the breadwinner or husband did not render the dependant"s action for loss of support a nullity. This decision in the Lee-case, which favoured dependants action for loss of support has its bearing or hinges upon the Germanic principles of wergeld and zoengeld. This Germanic principles and the Lee-case pave the way for such decision to be developed and moulded under constitutional premises so that it also be extended to dependant"s action for loss of support to children born out of wedlock, polygamous marriages, religious marriages and gay and lesbian relationships.
INTRODUCTION
The gist of this study purports that a delict is a wrongful and culpable act which has harmful consequences.
1 A delict engenders an action for damages. 2 The law of delict evokes a compensatory function in that there must be some loss or damage for which the law makes compensation available. 3 The object of this study is to discuss some basic principles of the dependant"s action for loss of support, the assessment of damage as well as the quantification of the proper amount of damages under a constitutional dispensation on the law of damages.
II. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY OF THE PAPER
This paper rests solely on a theoretical study. The data acquired are going to be complemented by the author"s own interpretations of court cases, text books and other scholarly constructs. The rendition or analysis of the author out of a myriad of sources will be utilised in order to pose a holistic subject matter on the principle of dependant"s action for loss of income. This study will have to hark back to antiquity to achieve a holistic scope.After the attainment of a holistic nature of the paper, it is only then that this study will presents an innovative, thorough and systematic attempt to address the research questions raised therein. This article aims to present a strong, current and relevant theoretical or conceptual framework within which the inquiry is located.
III. DEFINITION OF DAMAGES
Damages is a monetary equivalent of damage awarded to a person with the object of eliminating as far as possible his past as well as future patrimonial, and where applicable, non-patrimonial damage. Money, in the IV.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE DEPENDANT'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT
The action of dependants for the recovery of loss suffered as a result of the wrongful killing of the breadwinner was unknown to Roman law. 11 This action or remedy, however, came to be recognised and firmly entrenched in Roman-Dutch law, under the influence of the Germanic custom concerning the institution of the zoengeldand the philosophy of natural law as developed by medieval and sixteenth century theologians. 12 Initially, the dependant"s action was not confined only to those classes of persons to whom the breadwinner had a legal obligation to support, but was also available to those whom the deceased was accustomed to support from a sense of duty. 13 De Groot extended the action to those whom the deceased was accustomed to aliment ex officio, for example his parents, his widow and his children. 14 This passage demonstrates that the action was applicable at the instance of any dependant within his broad family, whom, he in fact, supported whether he was obliged to do so or not. 15 The tendency to extend the dependant"s action to any dependant enjoying de facto
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RATIONALE OF THE ACTION FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT
It is stated in Evins v Shield Insurance Co. Ltd. 17 that a claimant (the dependant) derived his right of action not through the deceased or from the estate, but from the fact that he has been injured by the death of the deceased and that the defendant is therefore responsible at law. 18 Only a dependant to whom the deceased was under a legal duty to provide maintenance and support may sue, and in such action, the dependant must establish actual patrimonial loss, accrued and prospective, as a consequence of the death of the breadwinner. 19 Where a deceased"s estate generates sufficient income to support the dependants in full, no financial loss would be suffered as a result of the death of the deceased as per case law MacDonald and Others v Road Accident Fund. 20 Only actual material loss can be taken into account in an action of this kind. 21 In Hulley v Cox 22 , it is mentioned that material loss can only be ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him (the dependant) of the future pecuniary benefit, and on the other, any pecuniary advantage from whatever source comes to him (the dependant) by reason of the death of the deceased. 23 The Judge decided in MacDonald and Others v Road Accident Fund(supra) that the income on the fund in the estate came to the children by reason of the death of their father who had owed them a duty of support. 24 But, it is also maintained in Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 25 that when judges assessing damages for loss of support in claims arising from wrongful death, allowance must also be made for any new source of income which the plaintiff has obtained as a result of the death of the deceasedthis being regarded as "accelerated benefits." 26 The interest generated by the investment of the estate assets, payable to the children because of their father"s death, did therefore constitute an accelerated benefit.
4.3IS A WIDOW AND HER MINOR CHILDREN BARRED FROM THE CLAIMING OF DAMAGES FOR THE COMBINED NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE DECEASED?
It is common knowledge in law that when a party is negligent then he or she forfeits any remedial action for benefits. 27 This study tussle under this heading with the research question of whether the dependant will qualify for an action for loss of support where the deceased breadwinner was held to be negligent for his own death.
In Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Lee

28
, it has been established that a claim for damages by a widow or the minor children of a person whose death is alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant is not barred by the fact that the death is found to have been caused by the combined negligence of the latter and the deceased. Dr. Lee died as a result of injuries received, whilst driving his motor car which came 34 The LexAquilia caters only for damages to the deceased estate. Such principle fell short to an action for claiming of damages by the widow and the children and nullifies the tenor of this study. The Germanic Custom accommodated the widow and her children under the principles of the wergild and zoengeld. As mentioned earlier, these two principles entailed that there are no grounds on which the negligence of the husband can be imputed to his widow, thus forfeited her claim for damages. 35 Under Germanic
Custom the life of a freeman had a value capable of being estimated in money. 36 And by ancient criminal practices a payment had been exacted from the wrongdoer for the benefit of the family of the deceased. 37 The compensation claimable is due to third parties that derived their rights from the fact that they have been injured by the death of the deceased and that the defendant is in law responsible for it.
38
In the light of these renditions, the presiding judge in the Lee case decided that the negligence of Dr Lee does not bar the right of his widow and children to recover damages due to his death, which would not have occurred had not the Railway Administration been negligent also. The practice of zoengeld has disappeared from the modern law because of the introduction of public prosecution at the instance of the State, which Lee, p. 205 . The Roman Law source of the modern action for damages for negligence is the LexAquilia. The LexAquilia conferred upon owners a right of action for damage done to their property and it was necessary, therefore, firstly, that the plaintiff should be an owner or someone in a like position such as a bona fide possessor or a person having a jus in re aliena and the damage recoverable was the pecuniary lose suffered by the owner because of his property in the thing damaged. The widow of a deceased man has no property in him and it is difficult, therefore, to see how her claim against the wrongdoer could be derived from the LexAquilia. 43 The respondent based her claim for damages upon the allegation that the death of her husband was caused by the negligent driving of a mixed goods and passenger train by a servant of the Railway Administration. 44 The respondent"s husband, Marais, died as a consequence of the derailment of the train. Marais was in possession of a valid second class ticket from WorcestertoTouws River. The conductor allocated to him a compartment in the guard"s coach at the tail end of the train. Marais remained in the compartment until De Doorns was reached, where he left his compartment and joined the driver and fireman of the train on the engine-room and remained there until the derailment took place. 45 As a result of the derailment, the driver and stoker of the train and Marais died. The appellant, the Railway Administration and employer of the train driver, averred that in so far as the train driver exercised control over the train, he was acting within the scope of his employment. 46 The Railway Administration further asserted that in so far as the train driver allowed Marais to travel in the engine-room, it was a personal and private act of the driver, which was beyond his (the train driver) authority and beyond the scope of his employment. 47 The Railway Administration also maintained that if Marais had at the time of the derailment travelled in the guard"s coach, which was allotted to him, he would not have been killed 48 . By this averment, the Railway Administration wanted to establish negligence and imputed it on Marais and the train driver in order to avoid liability for damages from the deceased"s dependants for loss of support. The Railway Administration also contended that no member of the public shall be allowed to travel on an engine-room, unless he is in possession of a printed or written permission from an authorised officer of the Administration. Marais was not in possession of such permission when he boarded the engine-room on the train. It is further alleged by the Railway Administration that it is not part of the duties of train drivers and stokers to make arrangements in regard to the transportation of passengers.
49
It is evident from the literature that the derailment had occurred as a result of the negligence of the train driver employed by the appellant, the Railway Administration. an injury caused to a third party by the negligent driving of a servant where the servant, contrary to express instructions given by his master, had given a third party a lift. The ground of the decision was that, although the act complained of was done by the servant during his employment, it was not done by him in the course of his employment.
57
The work entrusted to the train driver in the Marais case was to drive the train and he had to do it in such a manner as not to injure anyone while doing so.
58 It was not the work of the Railway Administration to transport passengers on the engine-room and if the driver chooses to do so, he was acting outside the scope of his employment. 59 The transportation of Marais upon the engine-room of the train is entirely the driver"s own act. 60 It was clearly not done for the purpose of furthering his master"s (Railway Administration) interests and was wholly outside the scope of his employment by conveying someone on his engine-room who had no right to be there. The judge decided in favour of the Railway Administration and said that Marais had no right to be in the engine-room and that the Railway Administration owed no duty to take care. 61 The driver caused the death of the deceased and the Railway Administration is therefore not liable to the deceased dependant"s for loss of support.
WHETHER THE LOSS OF COMFORT AND SOCIETY OF THE PLAINTIFF'S WIFE AND THE LOSS OF HER ASSISTANCE IN THE CARE OF HIS CHILDREN BY HER ENTITLED A HUSBAND TO A CLAIM FOR PECUNIARY DAMAGES
From time immemorial, the husband had always been the breadwinner of the family. This notion had been enshrined into the "hearts" of many legislations and statutes of all the jurisdictions all over the world. But it seemed this contention is not carved in stone, as it was challenged in the case law of Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) Eastern Districts Local Division, dismissing an exception to the plaintiff"s declaration by which the plaintiff claimed the sum of 3,000 Pounds Sterling from the Government as damages, alleged to have been caused by the death of his wife through the negligence of the servants of the Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours). The plaintiff"s wife was killed in a railway accident, and the plaintiff alleged that by her death, he has been deprived of the comfort and society of his wife and of her assistance in the care, clothing and upbringing of his seven children.
63
The defendant, the Minister of Railways and Harbours, averred that the plaintiff"s declaration discloses no cause of action in law. And, the defendant raises the question on appeal, of whether the loss of the comfort and society of the plaintiff"s wife and the loss of her assistance in the care, clothing and upbringing of his children by her, can form a basis for claim for pecuniary damages. It is averred from the case study that such a loss would only constituted ground for rewarding damages if the defendant (Minister of Railways) was found to be negligent. 64 In order to have a resolution on that legal statement, it is necessary to visit other cases about the dependant"s action for loss of support. For example, in Biccard v Biccard and Fryer 65 , it was said that the complete loss of the wife"s society constitutes the main element in the estimation of damages, but that was a case in which damages were claimed from an adulterer for the injury done to and the dishonour brought upon, the husband by the adultery of his wife. But the present case, Warneke, is a whole different action founded upon negligence.
Although the husband in the Warneke case is not mentioned as entitled to sue in the case of his wife"s death by way of or through negligence, the right of the husband in case of a needy person, whose life had been accustomed during her lifetime to support him, need not to be denied. The duty of supporting children is common to both parents unless one of them was destitute. Supporting must be construed to mean not only feeding or clothing, but also looking after their health and education according to their positions in life. If in the present case the plaintiff"s wife was accustomed, during her lifetime, to see to the clothing and upbringing of his children, she did more than her duty towards him and them, and, if by reason of her premature death his expenses in the care and education of the children are increased, then there would be a clear case of damnumreifamiliaris.
66 On the strength of this legal principle, the judge answered the question raised afore, by stating that the declaration of the plaintiff-husband did disclose a cause of action in law. 67 In other words, the plaintiff-husband would be entitled to claim as dependant damages for loss of support. In reciprocity, the judge stated that the allegation that the plaintiff-husband sustained damage because he was deprived of the comfort and society of his wife discloses in itself no cause of action in itself. The judge alleged that the loss of the society and comfort of the wife was a mere matter of sentiment and feeling. The loss could not be compensated for in money as was done in most adultery cases and specifically in the Biccard-case (supra). The judge said that the loss of a wife"s comfort and society is a loss which only affects the feelings, and not the property of the husband.
68 It is not a material loss and affords no ground for patrimonial damages. This reasoning of the judge was wrong. As indicated earlier, there was a move away from the LexAquilia which only accorded an action for damages to property and no provision was made for dependant"s action In light of the obligation of pecuniary contributions between spouses, it seemed that every wife is bound to supervise or assist in the care and upbringing of the children of the marriage. The law regards the wife as primarily in charge of the household affairs. This is a legal and sacred duty which she owes not merely to the children, but to her husband, who is entitled to demand her assistance in bearing a burden which the law has placed upon them both. 71 On the strength of this rendition, there is nothing inconsistent with the principles of law in allowing a husband who can show that his pecuniary expenditure in connection with the maintenance of his children had been directly and necessarily increased due to the death of his wife, to claim damages against the person who has negligently caused her death. 72 It is, therefore intact, that after the plaintiff-husband had made allowance and assist in the upbringing of the children, that he therefore, be entitled to pecuniary loss in the form of dependant"s action for loss of support.
In an obiter dicta, Judge De Villiers visited antiquarian legal sources to buttressed his decision. He cited Ulpian (D. 9, 3) who taught that an action for damages was given ex bono etaequo. Such action should be given to the wife and the children to recover medical expenses and also the value of the services. 73 If this is so, Judge De Villiers asserted that it is only fair and equitable that a husband should have an action for the damages sustained by him through the loss of his wife. In order to afford the husband a foot to stand on, Judge De Villiers cited Dow v Brown
74
, where a Scotch Court of Session held that a husband was entitled to recover for injury and loss of comfort and domestic happiness by the sudden and violent death of his wife.
The Judge therefore rendered a pioneered verdict when he decided that a husband should be able to recover damages as a solatium for his wounded feelings and for loss of comfort and domestic happiness. This ruling is novel in that it digressed from many other similar cases and is to be regarded anachronistic the practice of law today. But, it also marks a renewal in breaking from the past and set the pace for future legal practice and judicature. The decision of the judge in the Warneke case will eventually be seen as precedent by other judges, because it embraced a bold stand of change and serves as a blue print for engaging in modern day constitutional development. The judge urged though that the rendition in the Warneke case be implemented by the Legislature for purposes of legitimacy.
ASSESSMENT OF THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES FOR DEPENDANT'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT
In the case law of Archibald v Attorney General 75 the deceased had been killed unlawfully by a member of the Botswana Defence Force.
76
At Roman Dutch common law, where a person has wrongfully caused the death of another, the dependants of the deceased are entitled to claim for loss of support sustained as a result of the deceased"s death. 77 The basis of such claim is that the dependants have, as a result of the death of the breadwinner, lost support, which the deceased was under a legal duty to provide for the dependants during his lifetime. 78 as an adjustment to allow for inflation from the date of the accident to date of trial. All these figures were done by firms of consulting actuaries in South Africa. 86 These firms employed the year-by-year method of calculations for the determination of the quantum of damages allotted to the plaintiff.
87
The Presiding Judge in the present case lambasted the Botswana judicature that relied too much on the judicial pronouncements of South African Courts. The actuarial calculations however, have its strong points.
88
For example, the South African Courts rely heavily on actuarial calculations, so much so that expert evidence of actuaries served as a substitute for the court"s own, less sophisticated calculations. Even the Appellate Division in South Africa is averse in interfering with the operation of the actuarial system. The Judge"s criticism of the actuarial system of calculation is contingent upon his comparison between South Africa and Botswana. He mentioned that in a country like South Africa, expert actuaries are aplenty and it is not difficult to make use of their services. 89 But in a country [like Botswana] where they are not readily available, and if it is the rule that such evidence is essential, a litigant may be forced to recruit the services of an actuary abroad. 90 The import of an actuary might increase the costs of litigation and may unnecessarily prolong the trial. In Botswana and many other developing countries, the majority of the people are poor and experts in certain specialised disciplines are not readily available. 91 Thus to insist on expert actuarial evidence in such a situation, would not only increase the costs of litigation, but would also cause hardship and unfairness. 92 But what could that be?
4.6
The most appropriate method of assessing damages suffered by dependant's for loss of income 4.6.1
The multiplicand/multiplier method of assessment The Judge maintained that the most appropriate method for assessing the quantum of damages in the Archibald case should have been the considerations for simplicity and reduction of costs.
97 This method was evolved by the English Courts and entailed a simple formula which judges and lawyers can easily apply and unnecessary costs should not be incurred by the parties in procuring evidence to prove the quantum of the loss. Such method might be formulated as thus: The value of the dependency is calculated by taking the present annual figure of the dependency and multiplying it by a figure which, while based upon the number of years that the dependency might reasonably be expected to last, is discounted so as to allow for the fact that a lump sum is being given now instead of periodical payments over the years. 98 The former figure is called the multiplicand and the latter is called the multiplier. 99 Further adjustments may be made to the multiplicand or the multiplier on account of a variety of factors, e.g. the probability of future increase or decrease in the annual dependency and the vicissitudes of life. In the English case law, Taylor v O'Conner 100 , the House of Lords discussed the multiplicand/multiplier method of assessment as follows: There are three stages in the normal calculations, namely (1) to estimate the lost earnings, that is, the sums which the deceased probably would have earned but for the fatal accident; (2) to estimate the lost benefit, that is, the pecuniary benefit which the dependants probably would have derived from the lost earnings, and to express the lost benefit as an annual sum over the period of the lost earnings; (3) to choose the appropriate multiplier which, when applied to the lost benefit expressed as an annual sum, gives the amount of the damages, which is a lump sum.
101
The multiplicand/multiplier method of assessment recognises that there are uncertainties in life. 102 In other words, cognisance is taken of the fact that experience has taught us that the vicissitudes of life are such that account must be taken of possible contingencies. 103 A random example of such contingencies are premature death of the deceased; the premature death of the wife or other dependants; that had the deceased survived, he may have been predeceased by his wife; the possibility that had the deceased not died, he may have become ill or rendered incapacitated, or may have become unemployed, or his earning capacity may have reduced. 104 The
Judge took these and other relevant factors in the Archibald-case into consideration in arriving at an assessment by adjusting the multiplicand or the multiplier accordingly. The Judge in Archibald relied on the strength of the Taylor case that the applicant and the children were entitled to such a sum as will make good to them the financial loss which they have suffered and will suffer as a result of the death. Future loss, however, is conjectural. But, in spite of the conjectural nature of the assessment, it is stated by Lord Pearce in Mallett v McMonagle 106 , that any assessment must contain elements of reasonable prophecy and arithmetic. 107 The multiplicand/multiplier method of assessment also provides for the awarding of a lump sum. 108 The Court recognises, however, that the lump sum may be invested and earn interest which would increase the value of the damages paid and therefore the money available to cover the loss suffered.
109
The Court therefore makes a discount for the fact that a lump sum is being paid.
110
The multiplicand is normally assessed by taking into account the deceased"s net income at the time of his death and from that calculate the amount expended on his dependents to arrive at the annual dependency.
111
If the deceased"s annual income was likely to increase or decrease after his death, appropriate adjustments are made to the annual dependency. 112 The annual dependency arrived at after the necessary calculations and adjustments is the multiplicand.
113
The multiplier is calculated by estimating the number of years that it is anticipated the dependency would have lasted had the deceased not been killed. 114 The expectation of life of the deceased is taken into consideration. 115 So also is the expectation of the life span of the dependent. 116 Other factors to be taken into consideration in the calculation are the trade or profession of the deceased, and the expected working life of the deceased. 117 It is important to emphasize that the multiplier is not synonymous with the life expectancy of the deceased or his expected working life. The multiplier is not fixed at the same figure as the life expectancy or the expected working life of the deceased. 118 Those are merely some of the factors that the Court takes into consideration in fixing the multiplier. The prospect of marriage of dependant may also reduce the multiplier. In other words the vicissitudes of life must be born in mind. 119 All these factors are taken into consideration in increasing or reducing the number of years and thereby arriving at a multiplier appropriate to the particular case. 120 In this exercise a judge should always bear in mind that his duty is to fix a multiplier making a fair allowance for all the uncertainties and possibilities. The starting point in any estimate of the number of years that a dependency would have endured, is the number of years between the date of the deceased"s death and at that date at which he would have reached normal retiring age.
121 That falls to be reduced to take account of the change, not only that he might not have lived until retiring age, but also the change that by illness or injury he might have been disabled from gainful occupation. 122 The former risk can be calculated from available actuarial tables. The latter cannot. 123 There is also the chance that the widow may be die before the deceased would have reached the normal retiring age or When the multiplicand and the multiplier have been arrived at, they are multiplied to arrive at a figure. 125 That figure may be further adjusted to arrive at a figure which the Court (in the Archibald case) considers fair and reasonable in the circumstances. 126 The multiplicand/multiplier method of assessment denotes that the damages awarded must be fair and reasonable. 127 It behoved a judge to try to fix a figure which is neither unfair to the recipient nor to the one who has to pay. With regard to the assessment of damages, the deceased"s annual salary had been increased to P30,360, i.e. P2,560 per month. 128 He was receiving P200 per month as rent allowance. 129 He was also entitled to the use of the firm"s vehicle and 25 per cent tax free gratuity at the end of his two year contract. In arithmetic terms: the taxable items were: Salary P30,360 Housing allowance P2,400 Private use of car P2,000 (it is not stated in the report how the figure was arrived at -the judge however assess the value of the use of the car at P2,000). Total:
P34,760
130
Allowing for income tax: the judge put the taxable income at P17,000. Adding one half of the gratuity due to the net taxable income, the result would be as follows: P17,000 P3,795 P20,795(ANNUAL INCOME) 131 The judge therefore arrived at net annual income of P20, 795.
132 He is to consider the dependency of the plaintiff and the three children on the basis of that net annual income. 133 The judge decided to assess the dependency of the plaintiff at two-sevenths and that of each child at one-seventh of the net income. 134 In the light of this contention he fix the dependency of the plaintiff at the date of death of the deceased at P5941,42 and that of each of the three children at P2970,71, which adds to a total dependency of P14,853,55.
What would be the appropriate multiplier?
In fixing the appropriate multiplier, the judge in the Archibald case has to bear in mind the vicissitudes and uncertainties of life. 135 The conventional multiplier when the deceased died in his twenties is 16 years. This multiplier is contingent upon a dictum in the case of Robertson v Lelestrange and Another. 136 In this case it is established that where the deceased was aged 29 and a half years and it was accepted that the expectation of life of the deceased was 72 at the date of death and that his working life was up to the age of 65 years, the multiplier was fixed at 16 years. 137 But the judge, ruled that the older the deceased, the lower the multiplier -the deceased was 35 years old during his untimely death. The Judge in Archibald, will now proceed to calculate the award of damages on the basis of the multiplicand and the multipliers. He fixed the multiplicand at P18,000.
143 Applying the agreed ratio of one to the plaintiff and one-half each of the three children, the multiplicand of the plaintiff would work out at P7200, and that of each of the three children at P3,600. 144 Applying a multiplier of 10 to the multiplicand of the plaintiff, the damages payable would amount to P72,000. And applying a multiplier of 13 to the multiplicand of each child, the damages payable to each child would amount to P46,800, totalling P140,400. 145 The total for the plaintiff and the three children is therefore P212,400. The Judge mentioned that it is common cause that the share of the estate of the deceased devolving on the plaintiff and the children, being a benefit accruing to them as a result of the death of the deceased, should be deducted from the damages of the estate. The Judge proceeded and deduct the sum of P10,745 from the total award leaving a balance of P201,655. action was extended to a partner in a same-sex permanent life relationship. 156 The partner was killed in a motor vehicle accident and a claim for damages (loss of support) was allowed against the defendant Road Accident Fund (RAF) by the surviving partner.
146
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
157
The defendant"s (RAF) argument was that the plaintiff"s claim for loss of support was not maintainable in law. 158 The plaintiff requested that the common law definition of marriage which required that a union be between a man and a woman, also be extended to persons of the same sex. 159 It meant that the common law action for damages for loss of support should be developed to include a person such as the plaintiff. 160 It was trite that a widow who was legally married to the deceased was entitled to bring an action for the loss of support for the unlawful killing of her husband. 161 It was the plaintiff"s case that the common law should be developed to place him in the same position.
162
The judge said in Du Plessis that a marriage gives rise to a reciprocal duty of support on the part of the parties to that marriage. 163 However, the law currently only recognises marriages that are conjugal relationships between people of the opposite sex. 164 There is, nevertheless, in the words of Judge Ackermann in National 167 The duty to support on the part of the deceased was further corroborated when it is stated in a dictum of National Coalition in Du Plessis that the plaintiff and the deceased lived together as if they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship until the deceased was killed some 11 years later. 168 They were accepted by their family and friends as partners in such a relationship. 169 They pooled their income and shared their family responsibilities and each of them made a will in which the other partner was appointed the sole heir.
170
When the plaintiff was medically boarded, the deceased expressly stated that he would support the plaintiff financially and in fact did so until he died.
171
In the light of this, the court in Du Plessis had to decide whether the killing of the deceased should be considered to have been a wrongful act against the plaintiff. asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. 178 Human dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all rights. 179 Section 10, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected.
In Khan v Khan 180 it is found that there is a duty on a husband to maintain his ex-wife to whom he was married according to Muslim rites in a situation where the marriage is in fact polygamous. 181 The judge related that the preamble to the Maintenance Act 1998 (Act 99 of 1998) emphasised the establishment of a fair and equitable maintenance system premised on the fundamental rights afforded in the Constitution of South Africa. 182 He further contended that the common law duty of support was a flexible concept developed and extended over time by the Courts to cover a wide range of relationships. The questions which Courts have considered in determining whether a particular relationship gave rise to a duty of support included whether the complainant required financial aid and whether the relationship between the parties created a duty to maintain. 183 The judge in Khan concluded by saying that despite the lack of a formal marriage, the needed to be pondered over. He alleged that all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights.
186 All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. 187 The Constitution is located in a history which involves a transition from a society based on division, injustice and exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the dignity of all citizens, and includes all in the process of governance. 188 As such, the process of interpreting the Constitution must be recognise the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution"s goal of a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. , Justice Ngcobo made the following comment (which also reverberated earlier in the text) with regard to the proper approach to legislative interpretation: "Section 39(2) of the Constitution contains an injunction on the interpretation of legislation. 190 It requires courts when interpreting any legislation "to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 191 Consistent with this interpretative injunction, where possible, legislation must be read in a manner that gives effect to the values of our constitutional democracy. Thus where legislation is capable of more than one plausible construction, the one which brings the legislation within constitutional bounds must be preferred."
192
In recapitulation, the common law duty of support is a flexible concept that has been developed and extended over time by our Courts to cover a wide range of relationships such as grandparents vis-à-vis grandchildren, and vice versa, children to their parents, brothers and sisters to each other, divorcees towards each other, same-sex partnerships and most recently extending the duty of support of an illegitimate child to its paternal grandparents.
193
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the tenor of this study that a dependant derived his or her right of action of loss of support from the fact that he or she has been injured by the death of the deceased or breadwinner and that the respondent is responsible for it. This study has answered the research question posed about the negligence of the breadwinner, whether such condition rendered the dependant"s action for loss of support null and void. In the Lee case the Court held that the negligence of the husband or breadwinner did not render the dependant"s action for loss of support a nullity. The widow"s or dependant"s loss of support is derived from the Germanic custom that allow for patrimonial loss also. The Germanic principles of wergeld and zoengeld entailed that there are no grounds on which negligence of the husband or breadwinner can be imputed to his widow. This idea is in line with the modern day Constitution of South Africa in which the dependant"s action for loss of support have been extended to illegitimate, polygamous and Islamic and gay and lesbian relationships.
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